7. Noncompliance and Instrumental Variables

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Where are we? Where are we going?

- · We've covered randomized experiments (no confounding)
- We've covered selection on observables (no unmeasured confounding)
- What if there is unmeasured confounding? What can we do?

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- We've covered selection on observables (no unmeasured confounding)
- · What if there is unmeasured confounding? What can we do?
- First approach we will explore: instrumental variables
 - First: motivate IV through experiments and noncompliance.
 - · Next: discuss how it relates to classical econometric methods like 2SLS?

Researcher: You, are in the control group. No need to take the treatment

Defier: But I want it!

Researcher: Just kidding, you are in the treatment group. Here it is

Defier:



Source: Causal Inference for the Brave and True By Matheus Facure Alves

1/ Randomized Experiments with Noncompliance

Noncompliance

• Get-out-to-vote (GOTV) experiment with door-to-door canvassing:



Source: https://www.dreamstime.com/political-meeting-candidates-pre-election-campaign-concept-multinational-people-support-banners-man-woman-voters-flat-image 185175984

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 - $Z_i = 1$ for assigned to treatment (canvassing attempted),
 - $Z_i = 0$ for assigned to control (no canvassing attempted).

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- · Households are randomized so treatment assignment is unconfounded
 - $Z_i = 1$ for assigned to treatment (canvassing attempted),
 - $Z_i = 0$ for assigned to control (no canvassing attempted).
- **Noncompliance**: units don't follow treatment assignment.
 - Units assigned to treatment take control or vice versa.
 - $D_i = 1$ for actually took treatment (heard canvasser message).
 - $D_i = 0$ for actually took control (didn't answer the door).
 - Full compliance means $Z_i = D_i$ for all i.

How to Handle Noncompliance?

- · Two approaches commonly seen in applied studies:
 - 1. Intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis: just use randomization.
 - Use Z_i as the treatment and analyze as a typical experiment.
 - Downside: can't learn about the effect of actually being canvassed!
 - 2. **As-treated** analysis: just use treatment uptake.
 - As if D_i was randomly assigned.
 - · Not valid if uptake is correlated with outcome.
 - \rightsquigarrow unmeasured confounding between D_i and **PO**s

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- Alternative: leverage latent strata of compliance types.

Setup

- Treatment assignment, $Z_i \in \{0, 1\}$; treatment uptake, $D_i \in \{0, 1\}$,
- Treatment uptake is affected by assignment: $D_i(z)$
 - $D_i(1) = 1$ if assigned to canvassing, I **would** open my door.
 - $D_i(1) = 0$ if assigned to canvassing, I would not open my door.
 - Noncompliance means $D_i(z) \neq z$ for some i.
- Consistency for the observed treatment as usual:

$$D_i = D_i(Z_i) = Z_i D_i(1) + (1 - Z_i) D_i(0)$$

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- Canvassing is an example of one-sided noncompliance.
 - People might refuse treatment when offered (i.e., $D_i(1) = 0$)
 - But no one receives treatment if in control (i.e., $D_i(0) = 0, \forall i$)
 - Two-sided noncompliance is when you can refuse to comply with treatment or control.

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 - $Y_i(1, D_i(1))$: potential outcome when assigned canvassing and whether uptake occurs for unit i when assigned to canvassing.
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- Consistency assumption: $Y_i = Y_i(Z_i, D_i(Z_i))$

Some Notations

• Let's use 0/1 subscripts for assignment, and t/c subscripts for uptake:

$$n_1 = \sum_{i=1}^n Z_i$$
 $n_0 = \sum_{i=1}^n (1 - Z_i)$ $n_t = \sum_{i=1}^n D_i$ $n_c = \sum_{i=1}^n (1 - D_i)$

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Average outcomes and uptake in each assignment group:

$$\overline{Y}_{1} = \frac{1}{n_{1}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_{i} Y_{i} \qquad \overline{Y}_{0} = \frac{1}{n_{0}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (1 - Z_{i}) Y_{i}$$

$$\overline{D}_{1} = \frac{1}{n_{t}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_{i} D_{i} \qquad \overline{D}_{0} = \frac{1}{n_{c}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (1 - Z_{i}) D_{i}$$

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- Assumption 1: **randomization** $[\{Y_i(d,z), \forall d, z\}, D_i(1), D_i(0)] \perp Z_i$
 - For observational uses of IV, might condition on some \mathbf{X}_i .

Defining ITT Effects

• **Intent-to-treat** (ITT) effects are just the ATEs of Z_i :

$$ITT_D = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n D_i(1) - D_i(0) \qquad ITT_Y = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n Y_i(1, D_i(1)) - Y_i(0, D_i(0))$$

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- · Standard estimators for these quantities:

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- Under randomization of Z_i , everything just like Neyman approach.
 - · Variances, tests, CIs all standard.
- Problem: ITT $_Y$ is a combination of true effect of D_i and noncompliance
 - Effect of D_i may be more externally valid than Z_i .

2/ Compliance Types

Compliance Status

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- · Compliance is a function of potential outcomes so it is **pretreatment!**
 - \rightsquigarrow treatment assignment independent of C_i

ITTs Among the Compliance Groups

- Compliance type indicator, $C_i \in \{co, nc\}$:
 - Number of compliers: $n_{co} = \sum_{i=1} \mathbf{1}(C_i = co)$.
 - Proportion of compliers: $\pi_{co} = n_{co}/n$.
 - Same for noncompliers: $n_{
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 - Same for noncompliers: $n_{\rm nc}$ and $\pi_{\rm nc}$.
- ITT on uptake is directly related to compliance type:

$$ITT_{D,nc} = \frac{1}{n_{nc}} \sum_{i:C_i = nc} D_i(1) - D_i(0) = 0$$

$$ITT_{D,co} = \frac{1}{n_{co}} \sum_{i:C_i = co} D_i(1) - D_i(0) = 1$$

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
$$ITT_{D,co} = \frac{1}{n_{co}} \sum_{i:C_i = co} D_i(1) - D_i(0) = 1$$

- Intuition: no effect of assignment on uptake for noncompliers!
- Implies that overall ITT on uptake equals the proportion of compliers:

$$\mathsf{ITT}_D = \pi_\mathsf{co} \cdot \mathsf{ITT}_{D,\mathsf{co}} + \pi_\mathsf{nc} \cdot \mathsf{ITT}_{D,\mathsf{nc}} = \pi_\mathsf{co}$$


3/ Instrumental Variables

Identification Assumptions




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 - $Y_i(z, d) = Y_i(z', d)$ for all z, z', and d.
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 - · Assignment to canvassing only affects turnout through actual canvassing
 - Not a testable assumption and cannot be guaranteed by design!
- Implies that potential outcomes only a function of D_i :

$$Y_i(1) = Y_i(D_i = 1) = Y_i(Z_i = 1, D_i = 1)$$

$$Y_i(0) = Y_i(D_i = 0) = Y_i(Z_i = 1, D_i = 0)$$

Outcome ITTs and Compliance Types

- We can define the ITTs on the outcome by compliance type as well.
 - ITT $_{Y,co} \rightsquigarrow$ effect of assignment on outcome among compliers.
 - ITT $_{Y,nc} \rightsquigarrow$ effect of assignment on outcome among noncompliers.
- · Exclusion restriction has implications for these:
 - Implies that ITT $_{Y,nc} = 0$: if D_i does not change, Y_i cannot change.
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 - Implies that $ITT_{Y,co}$ is due entirely to treatment uptake.
- Allows us to connect the ITT_Y on the outcome to compliance groups:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{ITT}_{Y} &= \pi_{\mathsf{co}} \cdot \mathsf{ITT}_{Y,\mathsf{co}} + \pi_{\mathsf{nc}} \cdot \mathsf{ITT}_{Y,\mathsf{nc}} \\ &= \mathsf{ITT}_{D} \cdot \mathsf{ITT}_{Y,\mathsf{co}} \end{aligned}$$

LATE

• Under the exclusion restriction, $ITT_{Y,co}$ is the effect of treatment receipt/uptake:

$$ITT_{Y,co} = \frac{1}{n_{co}} \sum_{i:C_i = co} Y_i(1, D_i(1)) - Y_i(0, D_i(0))$$
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 - It's a conditional ATE, where we condition on units being a complier.
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- This quantity is known as the **local ATE** (LATE), local to compliers.
 - It's a conditional ATE, where we condition on units being a complier.
 - Also referred to as complier average causal effect (CACE).
- **LATE theorem** under one-sided noncompliance, exclusion restriction, first-stage, and randomization:

$$au_{\text{LATE}} = \text{ITT}_{Y,\text{co}} = \frac{\text{ITT}_{Y}}{\text{ITT}_{D}}$$

Wald Estimator

• Wald or instrumental variable estimator for the LATE:

$$\widehat{\tau}_{\mathsf{iv}} = \frac{\widehat{\mathsf{ITT}}_{\mathsf{Y}}}{\widehat{\mathsf{ITT}}_{\mathsf{D}}}$$

- · Ratio of the two unbiased ITT estimators.
- Not 'unbiased', but it is **consistent** for $au_{ extsf{LATE}}$.

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- Not 'unbiased', but it is **consistent** for τ_{LATE} .
- Equivalent to the two-stage least squares estimator:
 - Regress D_i on Z_i to get fitted values, \widehat{D}_i .
 - Regress Y_i on \widehat{D}_i .
- We can use the delta method to find the (superpopulation) variance:

$$\mathbb{V}\left[\widehat{\tau}_{\mathsf{iv}}\right] = \frac{1}{\mathsf{ITT}_D^2} \mathbb{V}\left[\widehat{\mathsf{ITT}}_Y\right] + \frac{\mathsf{ITT}_Y^2}{\mathsf{ITT}_D^4} \mathbb{V}\left[\widehat{\mathsf{ITT}}_D\right] - 2 \cdot \frac{\mathsf{ITT}_Y}{\mathsf{ITT}_D^3} \cdot \mathsf{cov}\left[\widehat{\mathsf{ITT}}_Y, \widehat{\mathsf{ITT}}_D\right]$$

4/ Two-Sided Noncompliance

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- Encouragement design: randomly assign an encouragement of some treatment.
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 - · Some may take treatment even without encouragement.
- Z_i is the encouragement, and D_i is the treatment.
- No change in estimation, just different identification assumptions.

Compliance Types

- Four compliance types (or **principal strata**) in this setting:
 - Complier: $D_i(1) = 1$ and $D_i(0) = 0$
 - Always-taker: $D_i(1) = D_i(0) = 1$
 - Never-taker: $D_i(1) = D_i(0) = 0$
 - Defier: $D_i(1) = 0$ and $D_i(0) = 1$

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- Connections between observed data and compliance types:

$$Z_i = 0$$
 $Z_i = 1$
 $D_i = 0$ Never-taker or Complier Never-taker or Defier
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- Let π_{co} , π_{at} , π_{nt} , and π_{df} be the proportions of each compliance type.
- ITT effects on D_i are more murky: ITT $_D = \pi_{ ext{co}} \pi_{ ext{df}}$
 - · Defiers really makes things messy!

Instrumental Variables Assumptions

- Canonical IV assumptions for Z_i to be a valid instrument:
 - 1. Randomization of Z_i
 - 2. Presence of some compliers $\pi_{co} \neq 0$ (first-stage)
 - 3. Exclusion restriction $Y_i(z, d) = Y_i(z', d)$
 - 4. **Monotonicity**: $D_i(1) \ge D_i(0)$ for all i (no defiers)
- Implies ITT effect on treatment equals proportion of compliers: $\label{eq:transformation} \mbox{ITT}_{\mathcal{D}} = \pi_{co}$
- Implies that ITT for the outcome has the same interpretation:

$$\begin{split} \text{ITT}_{Y} &= \pi_{\text{co}} \cdot \text{ITT}_{Y,\text{co}} + \pi_{\text{at}} \cdot \underbrace{\text{ITT}_{Y,\text{at}}}_{=\text{o} \, (\text{ER})} + \pi_{\text{nt}} \cdot \underbrace{\text{ITT}_{Y,\text{nt}}}_{=\text{o} \, (\text{ER})} + \text{ITT}_{Y,\text{df}} \cdot \underbrace{\pi_{\text{df}}}_{=\text{o} \, (\text{mono})} \\ &= \text{ITT}_{\text{co}} \pi_{\text{co}} \end{split}$$

• \rightsquigarrow Same identification result: $\tau_{\text{LATE}} = \text{ITT}_Y / \text{ITT}_D$

Is the LATE Useful?

- The LATE is an effect on an unknown subset of the data.
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 - Control units are a mix of never takers and compliers.
- Without further assumptions, $\tau_{\text{LATE}} \neq \tau$.

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 - Control units are a mix of never takers and compliers.
- Without further assumptions, $\tau_{\text{LATE}} \neq \tau$.
- Complier group depends on the instrument → different IVs will lead to different identified estimands.
 - But, we cannot do any better in terms of point estimation without more assumptions.

In R: Wald and TSLS Estimator

```
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10
            # *Recall what we did in Nevman's approach*
            my_data # data includes Z, D, and Y
            # Proportion of compliers (using ITT_D)
           pi_co <- mean(my_data$D[my_data$Z == 1]) - mean(my_data$D[my_data$Z == 0])</pre>
            # Compute ITT's
            ITT_Y <- mean(my_data$Y[my_data$Z == 1]) - mean(my_data$Y[my_data$Z == 0])</pre>
            ITT D <- mean(my data$D[my data$Z == 1]) - mean(my data$D[my data$Z == 0])
           # (ITT_D = pi_co)
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\frac{12}{13}
\frac{13}{14}
           # TODO 1: Compute Wald estimator
            Wald est <- NULL
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            # TODO 2: Compute variance
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           # TODO 2-1: Compute variance terms using neyman estimator
           Var ITT Y est <- NULL
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           Var ITT Y est <- NULL
           # Compute covariance term
           # demean
           demeaned_y <- my_data$Y[my_data$Z == 1] - mean(my_data$Y[my_data$Z == 1])</pre>
            demeaned d <- mv data$DFmv data$Z == 17 - mean(mv data$DFmv data$Z == 17)
            # denominator
           denom <- sum(my_data$Z)*(sum(my_data$Z) - 1)
           Covar est <- (demeaned v %*% demeaned t)/denom
            # TODO 2-2: Compute the estimate of the formula in p.6
            Var Wald est <- NULL
            # Or use TSLS with AER::ivreg
            ivmodel <- AER::ivreg(Y ~ D | Z, data = mv data)
            ivpack::robust.se(ivmodel)
```

Onto the presentations & discussions!

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